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NOTES 
The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private 
Homosexual Conduct 
The laws of forty-three states and the District of Columbia impose 
criminal penalties on consenting adults who engage in private homo-
sexual conduct. Most of these laws are sodomy statutes, which also 
prohibit oral and anal intercourse benveen heterosexuals and sexual 
acts with animals.1 Two states have statutes explicitly limited to 
homosexual conduct.2 These statutes also prohibit nonconsensual 
homosexual activity and homosexual acts involving a minor, but this 
Note addresses only prohibitions on private consensual adult homo-
sexual conduct. 
Although the immediate impact of statutes prohibiting such ac-
tivity may be slight because complaints are infrequently brought, 8 
1. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 106 (1959); ALAs. STAT. § 11.40.120 (Supp. 1973); ARlz. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-651 (Supp. 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-813 (1964); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§§ 286, 288a (West 1970); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 800.01-.02 
(Supp. 1973-74) (§ 800.01 held unconstitutional for vagueness in Franklin v. State, 257 
S.2d 21 (Fla. 1971)); GA. CODE ANN.§ 26-2002 (1972); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 768-71 (1968); 
IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (Supp. 1974), reenacting IDAHO CoDE § 18-6605 (1948); IND. ANN. 
STAT. § 10-4221 (Supp. 1974), amending IND. ANN. STAT. § 10--4221 (1956); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 705.1 (1950); KY. REv. STAT. ch. 510 (KY. REv. STAT. ch. 406, § 81(1) (Interim 
Supp. 1974)); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-89 (1951); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1001 
(1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 553-54 (1971); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 272, § 34 (1956); 
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 750.158, .338-.338a (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (Supp. 
1974); MISS. CoDE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.230 (1949); MoNT. REv. 
CoDES ANN. § 94-5-505 (Supp. 1973); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-919 (1964); NEV. REv. STAT. 
§ 201.190 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632.2 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:143-l 
(1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-6 (1972); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.38 (McKinney 1967); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-07 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 21, § 886 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 18, § 3124 (1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-10-1 
(1970); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16.412 (1962); S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 22-22-21 (1967); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-707 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76--5-403 (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit 13, § 2603 (1974) (although this statute prohibits only fellatio, the Supreme Court 
of Vermont held sodomy to be a crime under the common law of Vermont in State v. 
La Forrest, 71 Vt. 311, 45 A. 225 (1899); VA. CODE ANN.§ 18.1-212 (Supp. 1973), amend-
ing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-212 (1960); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.79.100 (1956); W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 61--S-13 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.17 (1958); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-98 
(Supp. 1973), amending WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-98 (1957). 
The majority of states that prohibit homosexual conduct do so by forbidding 
"crimes against nature," "sodomy," or "buggery." Other statutes are more explicit For 
example, the District of Columbia statute provides: 
[E]very person who shall be convicted of taking into his or her mouth or anus the 
sexual organ of any other person or animal, or who shall be convicted of placing 
his or her sexual organ in the mouth or anus of any other person or animal, or 
who shall be convicted of having carnal copulation in an opening of the body ex-
cept sexual parts with another person, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or be 
imprisoned for a period not exceeding ten years. 
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1973). Only Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, lliinois, Ohio, 
and Oregon do not punish private consensual adult homosexual conduct. 
2. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (Supp. 1973); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. § 21.06 (1974). 
3, Fisher, The Sex Offender Provisions of the Proposed New Maryland Criminal 
[ 1613] 
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the existence of such laws has a significant impact upon homosexual 
people in at least three ways. First, laws prohibiting homosexual con-
duct may inhibit persons inclined toward that mode of obtaining 
sexual satisfaction from fulfilling their sexual desires. Second, the 
laws may encourage blackmail by providing a means whereby homo-
sexual people can be threatened with exposure or prosecution and 
may discourage employers from hiring homosexual people for fear 
that they may pose security risks because of their vulnerability to 
blackmail.4 Finally, laws prohibiting adults from engaging in private 
consensual homosexual conduct indirectly sanction existing discrimi-
nation against homosexual people in employment, housing, and pub-
lic accommodations. 5 
In Acanfora v. Board of Education6 a federal district court sug-
gested a number of constitutional bases for a right to engage in 
private consensual adult homosexual conduct, although it denied 
relief on other grounds to a homosexual school teacher seeking re-
instatement. The court suggested that prohibition of such conduct 
might be an infringement of the liberty protected by due process 
requirements,7 a violation of the right of privacy,8 a denial of equal 
protection,9 or an encroachment on individual associational rights 
under the first amendment.10 In a number of recent cases it has been 
contended without success that punishment of homosexual conduct 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth 
amendment.11 Reliance on the first12 and eighth18 amendments seems 
Code: Should Private, Consenting Adult Homosexual Behavior Be Excluded1, 80 MD, 
L REV. 91, 95-97 (1970); Ploscowe, Sex Offenses in the New Penal Law, 32 BROOKLYN 
L REV. 274, 284-85 (1966); Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: 
An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 
UCLA L REV. 643, 688-89 (1966). 
4. Note, Security Clearances for Homosexuals, 25 STAN. L. REV. 403, 409-11 (1973). 
5. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1973, § 4, at 5, col. 1 (late city ed.). 
6. 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), affd. on other grounds, 491 F,2d 498 (4th Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3209 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974). 
7. 359 F. Supp. at 850. See also w. BARNE1T, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 
94-135 (1973); Note, Homosexuality and the Law-A Right To Be Different1, 38 A.LnANY 
L REV. 84, 99-101 (1973). 
8. 359 F. Supp. at 852. See also In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 929 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 
1971); People v. Frazier, 256 Cal. App. 2d 630, 631, 64 Cal. Rptr. 447, 447-48 (1967) 
(holding that right of privacy does not apply to homosexual relationships among pris-
oners); People v. Roberts, 256 Cal. App. 2d 488, 495, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70, 74 (1967) (privacy 
argument summarily dismissed because conduct occurred in public restroom); Hughes 
v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, -, 287 A.2d 299, 304-05 (1972) (privacy argument not ap• 
plicable where minor involved); W. BARNE'IT, supra note 7, at 52-73; Note, supra note 7, 
at 92-96. 
9. 359 F. Supp. at 852. See also W. BARNE1T, supra note 7, at 260-68; Chaitin &: 
Lefcourt, Is Gay Suspect?, 8 LINCOLN L REV. 24 (1973); Note, supra note 7, at 101-02, 
10. 359 F. Supp. at 850. See also Note, supra note 7, at 98-99. 
11. Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333, 336-37 (W .D.N.C. 1964); People v. 
Frazier, 256 Cal. App. 2d 630, 631, 64 Cal. Rptr. 447, 448 (1968); People v. Roberts, 256 
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misplaced. This Note will examine the most promising of these 
arguments-the due process, privacy, and equal protection claims 
Cal. App. 2d 488, 495, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70, 74 (1967); Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, -, 
287 A.2d 299, 306-07 (1972); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 312 n.2, 191 N.W .2d 185, 
186 n.2 (1971). See also W. BARNErr, supra note 7, at 269-86; Note, supra note 7, at 
96-98. 
12. Freedom of association protects only the right "to associate with others for the 
attainment of lawful purposes." Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 
1361, 1367 (1963). See also Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961); Scales v. 
United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228-30 (1961). Thus, freedom of association does not deter-
mine whether a state can make unlawful the homosexual acts that are the object of 
individual associations between homosexuals. Similarly, the argument that freedom of 
expression protects homosexual acts because that conduct involves expression, at least 
between the partners, seems weak. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), holds that 
a state cannot punish an individual for mere private possession of obscene material, 
but that case means only that freedom of expression protects the "right to receive in-
formation and ideas." 394 U.S. at 564. Freedom of expression does extend to some ex-
pressive acts, see, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969) (picketing); 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103-05 (1940) (picketing), but the Court has stated 
that "[w]e cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can 
be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to 
express an idea." O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (statute prohibiting 
knowing destruction or mutilation of selective service certificate upheld). See also 
Cox v. Louisiana, 369 U.S. 536, 555 (1965). The nonspeech aspect of homosexual 
conduct is probably sufficient to exclude the acts from first amendment protection. 
13. The eighth amendment argument relies on Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 
660 (1962), and Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). Robinson held that a statute 
imposing criminal penalties on narcotics addicts violates the eighth amendment 
because it punishes individuals for a status over which they have no control. Powell 
suggested that Robinson may be extended to include acts compelled by such a status. 
Although five justices voted to sustain against an eighth amendment challenge a 
conviction under a statute penalizing an individual for being found intoxicated in a 
public place, the four dissenters and Justice White, the swing vote, agreed that if 
Robinson prohibited punishment of a status such as chronic alcoholism, acts compelled 
by that status must also be immune from punishment. Justice White, however, thought 
that the defendant had made no showing that his acts were compelled by chronic al-
coholism, The other four justices distinguished Robinson as applying only to statuses, 
and not to acts. See also United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973) (majority relied on status/act distinction; four dissenters 
would have allowed the defense of compulsion to crime of possession of heroin). 
The argument that criminal punishment of homosexual behavior comes within the 
prohibition of Robinson and Powell suffers from defects more serious than the unclear 
consensus in Powell. First, the compulsion involved in homosexual acts is less clear 
than the compulsion involved in narcotics addiction or chronic alcoholism. The present 
understanding of homosexuality is that an individual's sexual preference is not the 
result of a voluntary decision. See text accompanying notes 86-98 infra. However, 
it does not necessarily follow that a homosexual person is compelled to engage in 
homosexual acts. The sexual drive is a basic one, but some heterosexuals remain 
celibate and certainly not every homosexual act is compelled. Furthermore, the conten-
tion that not all homosexual acts are a matter of choice implies the debatable conclusion 
that homosexuality is a disease. In late 1973 the Board of Trustees of the American 
Psychiatric Association (AP A) decided to remove homosexuality from the list of 
mental diseases. N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1973, at 1, col. 1 (late city ed.). The Board's action 
was approved by a general vote of the AP A membership in April 1974, although only about 
one half of the membership voted, and of that group two fifths disagreed. N.Y. Times, 
April 9, 1974, at 12, col. 4 (late city ed.). Second, the eighth amendment argument would 
not invalidate the statutes forbidding private consensual homosexual acts but would 
only require that persons charged under such statutes be allowed to defend on the 
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-and attempt to evaluate them in light of the state interests in 
forbidding private homosexual conduct. 
The due process and privacy arguments are closely related; privacy 
has been held to be protected by the due process clause.14 As far as 
homosexual rights are concerned, there is little difference between 
arguing that a new due process right should be recognized and 
arguing that an established one should be expanded. However, the 
first argument leads to a more expansive interpretation of the due 
process clause than the second. 
The theory that homosexual conduct per se is a fundamental 
right protected from governmental infringement by the due process 
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments rests on the notion 
that due process guarantees not only certain procedural safeguards1G 
but also a number of substantive rights.10 Although the Court has 
become reluctant to apply the due process clause to state economic 
regulation,17 it remains willing to strike down state laws infringing 
on personal or civil rights where the competing state interests are 
not adjudged compelling.18 
To be protected under the traditional concept of substantive due 
process, however, rights must be based upon "some principle of 
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to 
be ranked as fundamental."19 This "fundamental rights" view of due 
process would not embrace all of the specific guarantees against 
federal action included in the Bill of Rights, but only those that are 
"of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.''20 Opposed to this 
ground that such acts were compelled. As under the insanity defense, the successful 
defendant might be incarcerated in an institution, a result perhaps less appealing than 
conviction. Moreover, the defense will only be successful where the defendant can 
show that the homosexual acts were in fact compelled. The burden of proof may render 
the defense useless. Finally, the argument may prove too much. It would also apply to 
homosexual conduct that occurs in public, is accompanied by force, or involves a minor. 
Acceptance of the argument would logically require constitutionalizing this kind of 
psychic compulsion as an element of the insanity defense to any criminal charge. Cf. 
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536-37 (1968). 
14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
15. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront and examine 
witnesses); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel). 
16. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to educate one's 
child as one chooses); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to study the German 
language in a private school). 
l'l. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963). 
18. E.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973): 
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965). See text accompanying notes 118-67 infra. 
19. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). See generally Kauper, Penumbras, 
Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold 
Case, 64 MICH. L. R.Ev. 235, 236-40 (1965). 
20. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
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potentially broad interpretation21 is the incorporation approach, 
according to which the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment was intended only to make the entire Bill of Rights applicable 
to state governments.22 A majority of the Court has never accepted 
the doctrine of total incorporation of the first eight amendments.23 
The Court has, however, selectively incorporated the fifth amend-
ment's privilege against self-incrimination24 and the sixth amend-
ment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him,25 
among other rights, and it has used the due process clause to protect 
rights not expressly included in the Bill of Rights.26 
In Griswold v. Connecticut21 the Supreme Court held the right 
of marital privacy to be constitutionally protected. Although all of 
the concurring justices applied the due process clause and found that 
Connecticut's ban on the use of contraceptives infringed on the right 
of privacy, they disagreed as to the constitutional source of the right. 
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court appeared to follow the in-
corporation doctrine.28 He did not, however, insist on finding a right 
of privacy explicitly stated in the Bill of Rights, arguing instead that 
a penumbra! right of privacy inheres in the first, third, fourth, fifth, 
and ninth amendments.29 Justice Clark apparently endorsed this 
approach since he joined no other opinion. In separate concurring 
opinions Justices Harlan and White expressly rejected the incorpora-
tion approach in favor of the fundamental rights version of due 
process.80 Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion, in which Chief 
Justice Warren and Justice Brennan joined, emphasized "the rele-
vance of [the Ninth] Amendment in the Court's holding."31 This 
21. As applied in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), the fundamental rights 
doctrine was more restrictive than the incorporation approach. It provided a basis for 
deciding that some of the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights are not applicable 
to the states under the fourteenth amendment. But the language of the test is so vague 
that it could be used to embrace rights outside the Bill of Rights. For one such expan-
sionary use of the test see text accompanying notes 27-33 infra. 
22. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black 8c Douglas, JJ., 
dissenting). But see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting} 
(fundamental rights not confined to the Bill of Rights). 
23. Kauper, supra note 19, at 240. 
24. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963). 
25. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). See generally Kauper, supra note 19, at 
238-39. 
26. E.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (right not to be 
arbitrarily excluded from bar); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (right of public 
employee not to be dismissed arbitrarily). 
27. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
28. Kauper, supra note 19, at 244. 
29. 381 U.S. at 484-85. See also Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d 817, 
24 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962); Beilicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P .2d 288, 61 
Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962). 
30. 381 U.S. at 502 (White, J., concurring); 381 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
31. 881 U.S. at 487. 
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approach approximates the fundamental rights view in result, because 
Justice Goldberg reasoned that" ... the Ninth Amendment simply 
lends strong support to the view that the 'liberty' protected by the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from infringement by the Federal 
Government or the States is not restricted to rights specifically 
mentioned in the first eight amendments. "82 
Eight years after Griswold seven justices agreed that the right of 
privacy is founded squarely on the fourteenth amendment's concept 
of personal liberty.33 In light of the Court's willingness to use the 
flexible fundamental rights approach to expand due process liberty 
to include the right of privacy, the way is now open to argue that the 
right to engage in private consensual homosexual conduct is also 
"fundamental" and therefore protected by the due process clause. 
One criticism of this argument is suggested by Justice Rehnquist's 
dissent in Roe v. Wade,34 in which the Court held that a woman's 
right to an abortion was protected under the due process clause. 
Rehnquist noted that "[t]he fact that a majority of the States reflect-
ing, after all, the majority sentiment in those States, have had restric-
tions on abortions for at least a century is a strong indication, it 
seems to me, that the asserted right to an abortion is not 'so rooted 
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental. . . .' "35 That the laws of forty-three states and the 
District of Columbia prohibit homosexual conduct arguably evi-
dences a majority sentiment that the right to engage in such conduct 
is not fundamental. Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist's argument was 
not accepted by the majority in Wade. Moreover, the infrequent 
enforcement of laws against homosexual conduct36 implies that they 
do not reflect public sentiment. 
Another criticism of the argument that homosexual conduct is 
per se a fundamental right is directed against the fundamental rights 
approach itself. It has been argued that the vagueness of the approach 
leaves a court too free to inject its subjective values into the due 
process clause.37 The resultant uncertainty may strain the federal-state 
balance of power by. leaving state courts and legislatures with little 
guidance in evaluating or formulating state laws. Despite this criti-
cism the Court has apparently reaffirmed the fundamental rights 
32. 381 U.S. at 493. 
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (opinion for the Court by Blackmun, J., 
joined by Burger, C.J., Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall 8: Powell, JJ.). 
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
35. 410 U.S. at 174, quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
36. See materials cited note 3 supra. 
37. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-13, 528 (1965) (dissenting opinions by 
Black & Stewart, JJ.); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69-71 (1947) (Black, J., 
dissenting); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 
920, 935-43 (1973). 
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approach in Griswold and Wade. The danger of judicial subjectivity, 
however, suggests that the Court may be reluctant to create funda-
mental rights beyond those already recognized.38 
The recognition of a new fundamental right is not necessary, 
however, if the right to engage in private consensual adult homo-
sexual conduct is an aspect of the right of privacy. Because it has been 
established that the due process clause protects the right of privacy, 
further debate between adherents of the incorporation approach and 
adherents of the fundamental rights test for defining the limits of 
substantive due process would be irrelevant. Although Griswold 
recognized a right of marital privacy, in none of the four opinions 
that concurred in the judgment of the Court was there an affirmative 
indication that the right extended beyond the protection of the 
marital unit. Indeed, Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman?9 
which first recognized marital privacy as a fundamental right, ex-
plicitly excluded homosexual practices. Justice Goldberg's opinion in 
Griswold also excluded deviant sexual conduct from the right and 
cited Harlan's language in Poe with approval.40 Thus at least four 
of the Griswold justices would definitely not have been willing to 
expand privacy to include homosexual conduct. 
Subsequently, however, in Eisenstadt v. Baird41 the Court sug-
gested that the right of privacy included the right of unmarried 
adults to use contraceptives. Although the Court based its holding 
on an equal protection theory and did not decide the due process 
question, it stated: "It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in 
question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet ... [i]f the right of 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether 
to bear or beget a child."42 If the right of privacy extends to the 
sexual conduct of unmarried heterosexuals, it is hard to see why it 
would not also apply to the private sexual conduct of homosexuals. 
In Roe v. Wade48 and its companion case Doe v. Bolton44 the 
Court held that the right of privacy "was broad enough to encompass 
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."45 
The majority in Wade explained that" ... only personal rights that 
38. Cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (right 
to education not fundamental); Lindsey v. Norm.et, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (right to 
decent, safe, sanitary housing not fundamental); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 
485 (1970) (right to receive welfare payments not fundamental). 
39. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
40. 381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
41. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
42. 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis original). 
43. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
44. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
45. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153. 
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can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty,' ... are included in this guarantee of personal privacy,"46 
and noted that the right of personal privacy had already had "some 
extension to activities relating to marriage, . . . procreation, . . . 
contraception, . . . family relationships, . . . and child rearing and 
education .... "47 As observed by Justice Douglas, these activities all 
involve "the basic decisions of one's life."48 The majority also stressed 
the fundamental importance to a woman of her decision to have an 
abortion: 
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a dis-
tressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental 
and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the 
distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and 
there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, 
psychologically and othenvise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this 
one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed 
motherhood may be involved.49 
A homosexual's decision whether to follow his or her sexual 
preference is also a basic one. It influences his or her choice of friends, 
social activities, and family relations, and bears on the decisions to 
marry and to procreate. 50 It may also influence one's self-image and 
affect how one is perceived by others. The decision to abide by the 
laws prohibiting homosexual conduct may result in psychological 
harm through frustration of the preferred sexual outlet. 51 
Justice Douglas's concurrence in Bolton seems to equate the right 
of privacy with !a right of personal autonomy. He offers a "cata-
logue"52 of rights protected under the due process clause: 
First is the autonomous control over the development anc& ex-
pression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personality. 
Second is freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life 
46. 410 U.S. at 152, quoting Palko v. Connecticut, !302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
By ignoring Justice Rehnquist's claim that an abortion operation in a hospital 
"is not 'private' in the ordinary sense of the word," 410 U.S. at 172 (dissenting opinion), 
the majority extended the right of privacy beyond absolutely private conduct. But cf, 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (right of privacy does not protect 
showing of obscene material in a place of public accommodation). 
47. 410 U.S. at 152-53, citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 4!38 (1972) (contraception); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 
(1944) (family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 5!35 (1942) (procreation); 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (child rearing and education); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (same). 
48. 410 U.S. at 211-l2 (emphasis omitted) (concurring opinion in Doe). 
49. 410 U.S. at 153. 
50. Some homosexuals marry and have children despite their sexual preference, 
however. P. Wn.soN, THE SEXUAL DILEMMA 52·53 (1970). 
51. G. WEINBERG, SoClETY AND THE HEALTHY HOMOSEXUAL 78-82, 142-43 (1972), 
52. 410 U.S. at 210. 
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respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the 
education and upbringing of children. 
Third is the freedom to care for one's health and person, freedom 
from bodily restraint or compulsion, freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf.53 
This approach would not lead to absolute protection of personal 
whims because legitimate state incursions on personal autonomy 
would still be upheld under the compelling state interest test.64 But 
it would require that that test be applied to a wider range of personal 
interests-almost certainly including private homosexual conduct 
-than would the majority's approach. 
The lower federal courts and the state courts have given the 
privacy argument a mixed reception. Some lower courts have inter-
preted the right of marital privacy recognized in Griswold as extend-
ing to any kind of private sexual activity between consenting 
spouses.50 Where one participant is a minor,56 where force is in-
volved,57 or where the challenged conduct does not take place in 
private, 58 courts uniformly have refused to extend the protection 
of the right of privacy. One district court, relying on Eisenstadt, 
has suggested that the right of privacy protects private acts of sodomy 
between unmarried, heterosexual consenting adults: 
It is not marriage vows which make intimate and highly personal 
the sexual behavior of human beings. It is, instead, the nature of 
sexuality itself or something intensely private to the individual that 
calls forth constitutional protection. While the condition of marriage 
would doubtless make more difficult an attempt by government to 
justify an intrusion upon sexual behavior, this condition is not a 
prerequisite to the operation of the right of privacy.69 
Several cases holding that discrimination on the basis of sexual 
preference with regard to citizenship60 and employment61 is an uncon-
53. 410 U.S. at 211-13 (emphasis original). 
54. 410 U.S. at 215-18 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
55. Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968); 
Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated on other grounds 
sub nom. Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971). 
56. Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 
(1972); Pruett v. State, 463 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App.), appeal dismissed sub nom. 
Pruett v. Te.xas, 402 U.S. 902 (1971). 
57. Towley v. Peyton, 303 F. Supp. 581 (W.D. Va. 1969). 
58. Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965); People v. Frazier, 256 
Cal. App. 2d 630, 64 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1967). 
59. Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620, 625 (E.D. Va. 1973) (participants waived 
right of privacy by allowing photographs of acts of sodomy to fall into hands of 
daughters). 
60. In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
61. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Schlegel v. United States, 416 
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stitutional invasion of privacy might also support the extension of 
the right to private consensual adult homosexual conduct, although 
the holding that discrimination against a class of individuals engag-
ing in particular conduct is unconstitutional does not necessarily 
imply that the right to engage in that conduct is constitutionally 
protected.62 
A finding that certain homosexual conduct is protected by the 
right to privacy would not, without more, invalidate state laws pro-
hibiting such conduct. The finding would simply subject the laws to 
"strict scrutiny"-analysis of whether compelling state interests exist 
that justify the prohibitions. Because the competing state interests are 
the same under due.process and equal protection analysis, discussion 
of them will be deferred until the equal protection avenues to strict 
scrutiny have been explored. 
The sodomy statutes may be attacked on equal protection grounds 
because they discriminate against homosexuals. The discrimination 
is obvious in statutes that explicitly prohibit homosexual intercourse 
but do not prohibit any heterosexual acts.63 Those that proscribe 
all oral and anal intercourse64 prohibit some acts that may be engaged 
in by heterosexuals; but they prohibit all forms of homosexual inter-
course. The disparity between the treatments of homosexual and 
heterosexual persons is reduced somewhat in thirteen states that 
punish isolated acts of fornication and adultery65 and to a lesser 
extent in the District of Columbia and sixteen additional states that 
punish only isolated acts of adultery.66 However, the fornication and 
F.2d 1372 (Ct. CI. 1969); Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 
82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969). Contra, McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971). 
62. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (although a state is not required to 
provide appellate review, it may not do so in a way that discriminates against indigent 
defendants). 
63. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (Supp. 1973); TEX. R.Ev. C1v. STAT. ANN. § 21.06 (1974). 
64. See statutes cited note I supra. 
65. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-2009 to -2010 (1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ '/68-13, -17 
(1968); !I>AHO CODE §§ 18-6601 to -6603 (Supp. 1974), reenacting IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6601, 
-6603 (1948); ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 101, 1551 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 272, 
§§ 14, 18 (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.34 (Supp. 1974), 609.36 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 2A:88-l, :110-1 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-22-08 to -09, -11 (1960); R.I. GEN. 
LAws ANN. §§ 11-6-2 to -3 (1970); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-103 to -104 (Supp. 1973); 
VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 18.1-187 to -188, -190 (1960); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-3 (1966): 
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 944.15-.6 (1958). 
66 • .AI.As. STAT. § 11.40.010 (1970); Aruz. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 13-221 (1956); COLO. 
R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 40-6-501 (Supp. 1971): CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-81 (1972): D.C. 
CODE ANN. § 22-301 (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.1 (1950); KAN. STAT, ANN, § 21-3507 
(Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 4 (1971); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN, §§ 750.29-,30 
(1968); NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 28-902 (1964); N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 645:3 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW§ 255.17 (McKinney 1967): OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 871-72 (1958): S.D. 
COMP. LAws ANN. § 22-22-18 (1967): VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 201 (1974): WASH. REv. 
CODE ANN. § 9.79.110 (1956). One state punishes fornication but not single acts of 
adultery. FLA. SrAT. ANN. § 798.03 (Supp. 1973-74). 
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adultery laws do not close all legal outlets for heterosexual love, 
as they do for homosexual love, and the penalties for these crimes are 
usually much less severe than those imposed by the sodomy laws.61 
Thus every state that prohibits oral and anal intercourse between 
members of the same sex implicitly classifies individuals on the basis 
of their sexual preference and discriminates against homosexuals. 
These state classifications violate the fourteenth amendment if the 
discrimination thereby created is so unreasonable and arbitrary as to 
constitute a denial of equal protection.68 Over the past quarter-
century the Supreme Court has been using a two~tiered standard 
of review of equal protection cases.69 When neither a fundamental 
right nor a suspect classification is involved, legislation is upheld so 
long as the classification it creates bears some rational relation to a 
constitutionally permissible purpose.70 When a fundamental right 
67. For example, Aruz. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 13-651 (Supp. 1973), provides a minimum 
punishment for sodomy of five years, and a maximum punishment of twenty years. 
The maximum imprisonment for adultery is three years. Aruz. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 13-221 
(1956). Fornication is not a crime in Arizona. See also AI.As. STAT. §§ 11.40.010 (1970), 
.120 (Supp. 1973); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-301, -3502 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.082-
.083, '798.03, 800.01 {Supp. 1973-'74); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-2002 to -2010 (1972); 
IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6601, -6603, -6605 (Supp. 1974), reenacting IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6601, 
-6603, -6605 (1948); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ '702.1, '705.1-.2 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 21-3505, -3507, -4502 to -4503 (Supp. 1973); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 101, 1001, 
1551 (1964); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 553-54 (1971); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 272, §§ 14, 
18, 34 (1956); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ '750.29-30, .158, .338-.338a, .503 (1968); NEB. 
R.Ev. STAT, §§ 28-902, -919 (1964); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-22--07 to --08, -11 (1960); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN, tit. 21, §§ 871-72, 886 (1958); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 11-6-2 to -3, 
-10-1 (1969); S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 22-22-17 to -18, -21 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
13, §§ 201, 2603 (1974) (see State v. La Forrest, '71 Vt. 311, 45 A. 225 (1899) (fine and 
imprisonment for sodomy within judge's discretion)); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-212 (Supp. 
1973), amending VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 18.1-190, -212 (1960); WASH. R.Ev. CODE ANN. 
§§ 9.'79.100, .110 (1956); w. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8-3, -13 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 944.15-.1'7 (1958). But see CoLo. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 40-6-501 (Supp. 1971) (adultery 
punished but neither sodomy nor fornication punished); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 53a-36, -81 (1972) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.36 (1964), 609.34, .293 (Supp. 
1974) (adultery and sodomy punished equally, fornication punished less severely); 
N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 632:2, 645:3, 651:2 (Supp. 1973) (adultery and sodomy 
punished equally, fornication unpunished); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ '10.15, 130.38, 255.17 
(McKinney 1967) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-201, -204, 5-403, '7-103 to -104 
(Supp. 1973) (adultery punished more severely than fornication and sodomy, which are 
punished equally). 
68. The federal government is similarly constrained by the due process clause of 
the fifth amendment, which includes the concept of equal protection. Bolling v. Sharpe, 
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
69. Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1065, 107'7, 
1120-23 (1969). 
'70. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973); 
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535,546 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 
(1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); Railway 
Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 
U.S. 464-, 466 (1949); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commrs., 330 U.S. 552, 556-57 
(1947); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 145-47 (1940); Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas 
Co., 220 U.S. 61, '78-79 (1911). There is a line of cases involving the rights of indigents 
to criminal appeals, however, that has elicited the strict scrutiny of the Court even 
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or a suspect classification is involved, a stricter standard of review is 
applied: Discriminatory legislation is upheld only when a state 
demonstrates a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved by 
less drastic means.71 The cases decided under the two-tiered standard 
suggest that the resolution of a given case is determined largely by 
which branch of the test the Court employs. Little legislation has 
been struck down under the rational relation test;72 little legislation 
has been upheld under the strict scrutiny test.73 
It has already been argued in the due process context that sodomy 
laws infringe upon fundamental individual rights.74 Fundamental 
rights for due process purposes include at least those rights that are 
fundamental for equal protection purposes.76 The Court, however, 
recently has been unwilling to expand fundamental rights in equal 
protection cases. 76 Even if homosexual conduct is an equal protection 
fundamental right, thereby subjecting sodomy laws to strict scrutiny 
under the equal protection clause, the due process argument alone 
would achieve the same result. Indeed, the charge has been made 
that in general "[w]hen an equal protection decision rests on [the 
fundamental right] basis, it may be little more than a substantive 
due process decision decked out in the trappings of equal protec-
tion."77 
The "suspect classification" arm 'of the equal protection test is 
not similarly dependent on due process and arguably mandates strict 
scrutiny of sodomy laws even if no fundamental rights are involved. 
Classifications already held suspect by the Supreme Court include 
those based on race,78 alienage,79 and national ancestry.8° Four justices 
though the right to a criminal appeal has not been held fundamental and wealth has 
not been held to be a suspect classification. See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Cf, 
materials cited note 107 infra. 
71. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No, 
15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
72. See cases cited note 70 supra. But see James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); 
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Stanley v. lliinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
'13. See cases cited note 71 supra. But see Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973); 
Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973). 
74. See text accompanying notes 15-62 supra, 
75. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (due process case citing equal 
protection cases in support of holding that right of privacy is fundamental). 
76. See cases cited note 38 supra. 
77. Note, supra note 69, at 1132. See also San Antonio Independent School Dist, v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 61 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring); Shapiro v. Thomson, 394 U.S. 
618, 659 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
78. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
79. Takahashi v. Fish &: Game Commn., 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Oyama v. California, 
332 U.S. 633 (1948). 
80. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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have held that sex is a suspect classification. 81 The following factors 
have been suggested as typical of suspect classifications: The classifica-
tions are based on traits over which the individual has no control,82 
the classifications "are frequently the reflection of historic prejudices 
rather than legislative rationality,"83 the groups discriminated against 
"are relatively powerless to protect their interests in the political 
process,"84 and they haye been "subjected to ... a history of purpose-
ful unequal treatment."85 
If homosexuality were physiologically determined, it would be 
clear that the homosexual person has no control over his or her sexual 
preference. There are, however, great differences of opinion regarding 
the causes of homosexuality.86 Although some experimental studies 
have adduced evidence that sexual preference is genetically deter-
mined, 87 they are currently given little credence.88 The theory that 
homosexuality is due to hormonal imbalance has also been rejected.89 
The prevailing view now seems to be that homosexual orientation 
"comes about as a result of experiences during the individual's 
lifetime, rather than as a consequence of an inborn physical peculiar-
ity."90 A psychoanalytic explanation of male homosexuality91 suggests 
that it results from a parent-child relationship that includes a seduc-
tive, overattached, domineering mother and a detached, hostile 
81. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973). The Court has not yet held 
suspect classifications based on wealth, see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973) (wealth not suspect where classification does not entail 
absolute deprivation); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U.S. 12 (1956), or legitimacy of birth. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. 
Aetna Cas. &: Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); 
Glona v. American Guar. & Llab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
82. Weber v. Aetna Cas. &: Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). 
83. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 (1973) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
84. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 (1973) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
85. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
86. D. ALTMAN, HOMOSEXUAL OPPRESSION AND LmERATION 16 (1971). 
87. The best known of these experiments is F.J. Kallmann's 1952 study of homo-
sexual twins. Thirty-seven homosexual persons who had identical twins were studied, 
and in every case the twin of the subject was also homosexually inclined. By contrast, 
of 26 sets of fraternal twins in which one of the members preferred homosexual 
conduct, only three sets were composed of pairs in which both twins were homosexually 
inclined, an incidence no higher than that of the general population. D. WF.Sr, 
HOMOSEXUALITY 169 (1968). 
88. C. BERG &: C. ALLEN, THE PROBLEM OF HOMOSEXUALITY 41 (1958); B. OLIVER, 
SEXUAL DEVIATION IN AMERICAN SoCIErY 126 (1967); SEx. INFORMATION AND EDUCATION 
COUNCIL OF THE UNlT.l!D STATES, SEXUAI.ll'Y AND MAN 78 (1970). 
89. W. BARNE'IT, supra note 7, 140-43; C. BERG &: C. A.I.LEN, supra note 88, at 41; 
B. OLIVER, supra note 88, at 126. 
90. D. WF.Sr, supra note 87, at 262. See also B. OLIVER, supra note 88, at 126. 
91. This discussion is limited to causes of male homosexuality because little study 
has been devoted to the causes of lesbianism. W. BARNEIT, supra note 7, at 149. 
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father.92 Other commentators stress a combination of varied ex-
periential factors in determining an individual's sexual orientation.03 
Some gay liberationists assert, perhaps in order to refute the disease 
model of homosexuality, that sexual orientation is in fact a matter 
of individual choice.94 
Regardless of the initial causes of homosexuality, an individual's 
sexual orientation once acquired is extremely difficult to alter.ms 
Although psychotherapists have reported cure rates of as high as 
fifty per cent, such cures may include instances in which the individ-
ual is merely refraining from homosexual conduct while retaining 
his or her homosexual inclinations.06 Nor do the :figures indicate 
whether those "cured" remained heterosexually oriented.07 More-
over, even if psychoanalysis can alter sexual orientation, the expense 
and the dearth of available analysts keeps the treatment out of the 
reach of most homosexuals.98 Homosexuality, therefore, can fairly 
be characterized as a trait over which the individual has no control. 
It can also be argued that discrimination against homosexuals is the 
reflection of historical prejudice. As argued below, 00 legislative classifi-
cations based on sexual preference are not the most rational way to 
achieve most of the legitimate state ends that might justify the 
prohibitions. Alternative statutory solutions do not exist if the goal 
is moral condemnation of homosexuality, but such an aim is itself 
indicative of a traditional bias against homosexuals. The lack of 
a substantial relationship between other state goals and statutes 
forbidding homosexuality suggests that the statutes intend only to 
repress homosexuals, but this argument is weakened by the admission 
that the statutes do have a minimal relation to some valid state 
goa1s.100 
Still, the political weakness of homosexuals and their history of 
legal oppression suggest that a legislative classification based on 
sexual preference is suspect. Like racial and ethnic minorities, homo-
sexuals constitute a relatively small percentage of the adult popula-
tion.101 No major political party has espoused homosexual rights. 
92. I. BIEBER, H. DAIN, P. DINCE, M. DRELLICH, H. GRAND, R. GUNDLACH, M. KREMER, 
A. R.!FKIN, C. WILBUR, T. BIEBER, HOMOSEXUALITY, A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY 310-13 
(1962). 
93. w. BARNEIT, supra note 7, at 165; P. FISHER, THE GAY MYSTIQUE 35-41 (1972), 
94. D • .ALTMAN, supra note 86, at 18. 
95. D. WEST, supra note 87, at 266. 
96. W. BARNEIT, supra note 7, at 227. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 233. 
99. See text accompanying notes 132-67 infra. 
100. See text following note 123 infra. 
101. Kinsey states that 37 per cent of the total male population has had some overt 
homosexual experience and that 4 per cent of white males are exclusively homosexual 
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The history of discrimination against homosexual individuals dates 
at least from the Biblical period.102 Although not every society has 
condemned homosexuality,103 Christianity's abhorrence of homo• 
sexual conduct resulted in its prohibition in many Western states.104 
When the Puritans emigrated to America, they brought with them 
their aversion to homosexuality, thus giving early rise to the strict 
prohibitions against homosexual conduct that remain substantially 
in force in forty•three states and the District of Columbia.105 The 
Victorian Age's revulsion toward all types of sexuality contributed 
to the discrimination against homosexual individuals in the legal 
systems of Great Britain and the United States.106 
In sum, classifications based on sexual preference share fully 
several of the indicia of suspect classes and share some of the others 
to a lesser extent. The argument is worth advancing, but it is not 
clear that the courts will recognize homosexuals as a suspect class. 
The Court, however, has not always explicitly applied the two• 
tiered standard; it has struck down state legislation that neither 
infringed on fundamental rights nor discriminated against a suspect 
class.107 Moreover, the rigidity of the division between the traditional 
two tiers of review has led to a search for alternative versions of 
the equal protection test.108 A standard with a less rigid gap between 
strict and minimal scrutiny might offer more protection for homo• 
sexual conduct. 
In his dissent in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
throughout their lives. A. KINSEY, w. POMEROY&: C. MAllTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE 
HUMAN MALE 650-51 (1948). It has been claimed that Kinsey's figures exaggerate the 
incidence of male homosexuality. Hunt, Sexual Behavior in the 1970's, Part VI: Deviant 
Sexuality, 21 PLAYBOY, March 1974, at 54, 54-55. 
102. Leviticus 18:22 states: "Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind; 
it is abomination." 
103. The Greek and Roman societies condoned, and even seemed to encourage, 
homosexuality. H. ELus, PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX 219 (1964); R. MITCHELL, THE HOMO· 
SEXUAL AND THE LAW 14 (1969). 
104. R. MITCHELL, supra note 103, at 14-15. 
105. Id. at 15. See statutes cited notes 1-2 supra. 
106. Id. at 15-16. 
107. See Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 
(1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &: Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 
U.S. 504 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 
(1971). For a discussion of the possibility that these cases use an intermediate standard 
see Note, Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre: The New, New Equal Protection, 72 MICH. 
L. REv. 508, 520-36 (1974). 
108. See, e.g., Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 85 
HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972). Gunther's model will not be discussed here. It appears to have 
found no support in the Supreme Court in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 
l (1974), which seems to reaffirm. the traditional approach despite the fact that the ap• 
pellate court employed a version of the Gunther test in reaching its decision. Boraas 
v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973). See Note, supra note 107, at 
547-51. 
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Rodriguez109 Justice Marshall advocates a general balancing test in 
which the state's interest in regulating conduct is weighed against 
"the constitutional significance of the interests affected and the in-
vidiousness of the particular classification."110 Marshall's test does 
not eliminate the categories of fundamental rights and suspect classifi-
cations, but tries to bridge the gap between strict and minimal 
scrutiny by suggesting that there are degrees of "fundamentalness" 
or "suspectness." Thus in Rodriguez Justice Marshall would have 
required a strong state interest to justify discrimination in educa-
tional benefits on the basis of community wealth because "[e]ducation 
directly affects the ability of a child to exercise his First Amendment 
interest,"111 and because group wealth hears many of the indicia of 
suspect classifications.112 It was argued above that matters of private 
heterosexual conduct and decisions regarding procreation that appear 
to he largely included in the fundamental right of privacy are very 
similar to the decision (if such it be118) to follow homosexual inclina-
tions: They all are basic choices respecting~ one's total life style. The 
decision to engage in homosexual conduct may affect one's hetero-
sexual and procreational activity, especially where the decision is to 
engage solely in homosexual conduct. This relationship to a funda-
mental right, while not as close as the nexus between education and 
first amendment rights Justice Marshall found in Rodriguez, is 
augmented by factors evidencing the suspect nature of a classification 
based on sexual preference. Thus, under the Marshall approach, the 
state should have to advance at least a fairly strong state interest to 
justify the prohibition of private consensual adult homosexual con-
duct. 
The chief criticism of this version of equal protection analysis is 
that the weighing of interests involving nonconstitutional rights is 
primarily a legislative and not a judicial function.114 Justice Marshall 
counters this criticism by arguing that the balancing he proposes is 
implicit in some of the Court's decisions purportedly reached under 
the traditional minimal scrutiny standard and therefore should be 
made explicit.115 Justice Douglas joined Justice Marshall's dissent in 
Rodriguez and Justice White has voiced some support for the ap-
proach.116 Nevertheless, a majority of the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
109. 411 U.S. I (1973). 
110. 411 U.S. at 109 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also United States Dept. of 
Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 519 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
Ill. 411 U.S. at 112 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
112. 411 U.S. at 122 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
113. See note 13 supra; text accompanying notes 87-98 supra. 
114. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 81 (1973). 
ll5. 411 U.S. at 110 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
116. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring). 
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the two-tier standard in Rodriguez and in Village of Belle Terre 
v. Boraas.111 
Traditional minimal scrutiny in equal protection analysis is very 
similar to the minimum scrutiny imposed on state laws under the due 
process clause. Where no fundamental interest is involved, due process 
also requires merely a rational relationship between the state law and 
some legitimate state interest, and is equally deferential to state 
legislative judgments.118 Neither of these minimum rationality stan-
dards requires that the government objective advanced to support the 
challenged statute have been the legislature's purpose in enacting the 
statute; the courts will search for a justification of their own.119 
Moreover, the state may not even be required to prove that the 
relationship between the statute and some legitimate state interest in 
fact exists; it may be sufficient that the legislature could have believed 
that such a relationship exists.120 However, equal protection is never-
theless denied if with respect to any plausible legislative goal the 
statute is arbitrarily underinclusive121 or overinclusive.122 Under-
inclusion that imposes a burden is generally a much less serious 
objection to a statute's validity than a burdening overinclusion.123 
Under this test there are a number of interests that might justify 
state prohibitions on private consensual adult homosexual conduct: 
protection of individuals, especially children, from sexual coercion; 
elimination or control of venereal disease; maintenance of a citizenry 
that can function well in society; preservation of the traditional 
institution of heterosexual marriage; and the guarding of public 
morality. All of these state interests are arguably legitimate. As the 
following discussion shows, most of them satisfy minimal scrutiny. 
I£ the sodomy laws infringe on a fundamental right ·or involve 
discrimination against a suspect class, however, they can be justified 
under either due process or equal protection tests only by a com-
pelling state interest that cannot be achieved by any less drastic 
117. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
118. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). 
119. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Flemming v. Nestor, 
363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960). 
120. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973); Railway Ex-
press Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949). But see Leathers v. City of Burns, 
251 Ore. 206, 444 P .2d 1010 (1968). 
121. "Under-inclusion occurs when a state benefits or burdens persons in a manner 
that furthers a legitimate public purpose but does not confer this same benefit or 
place this same burden on others who are similarly situated." Note, supra note 69, at 
1084. 
122. "An over-inclusive classification includes not only those who are similarly 
situated with respect to the purpose but others who are not so situated as well." Id. 
at 1086. 
123. Id. 
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legislative means.124 State interests that have been held important 
enough to qualify as compelling have included national security,12u 
maintenance of an efficient and impartial governmental service, 126 
preparation of accurate voter lists,127 protection of viable fetal life,128 
and protection of the health of pregnant women in the last two 
trimesters.129 The state must also be able to prove that the legislation 
in fact advances the alleged legislative purpose.180 Under strict scru-
tiny underinclusion and overinclusion can invalidate a statute even 
if not arbitrary. How much disparity a court will tolerate depends on 
its perception of the relative weights of the competing state interests 
and individual rights involved.131 Where the scope of an overinclusive 
statute could be narrowed and still achieve the state's goal, the statute 
is also invalid on the ground that less drastic means are available. 
Thus the compelling state interest/less drastic means test is difficult 
for a state to satisfy. It seems doubtful that any of the state interests 
in prohibiting homosexual conduct could satisfy this test. 
The state's interest in protecting individuals from sexual coercion, 
and more specifically in preventing child molestation or corruption, 
is not directly advanced by prohibitions on private consensual adult 
homosexual conduct. Nor is there settled proof that the prohibitions 
on such conduct indirectly further these state interests. No correlation 
has been proved benveen homosexual conduct and the incidence of 
sexual violence.182 Furthermore, despite the fact that "[t]he argu-
124. The compelling state interest/less drastic means test was first applied to first 
amendment cases. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 
361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 35'1 U.S. 449 (1958). For equal protection 
cases applying the test see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (19'12); Kramer v. Union 
Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
See also Note, supra note 69, at 1087-132. Due process cases applying the test include 
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting). 
125. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Communist Party of the United 
States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Wyman v. Uphaus, 360 
U.S. 72 (1959); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 213 (1944). See also Linde, "Clear 
and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN, 
L. R.Ev. 1163 (1970). 
126. United States Civil Serv. Commn. v. National Assn. of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 
548 (1973); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). 
127. Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973): 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
128. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973). 
129. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). 
130. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194-95 (1973): Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 
(1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972), quoting Royster Guano Co. v. 
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (196'1). 
131. Note, supra note 69, at 1101, 1103. 
132. R. Mrrcm:u., supra note 103, at 12. 
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ment most frequently advanced to support the continued statutory 
treatment of homosexuals as felons is that homosexuals are a menace 
to society in general and to children in particular,"183 the strength of 
the correlation between homosexual conduct and the molestation 
of children is in dispute.134 Moreover, one can argue that these state 
interests may be served by less drastic means by removing the pro-
hibitions on private consensual adult homosexual conduct while 
retaining laws against homosexual conduct by force or with a minor. 
A legal outlet for homosexual conduct might actually promote 
compliance with the laws against homosexual conduct with a minor or 
with a nonconsenting adult. The speculative nature of the relation-
ship benveen these state interests and the prohibitions is probably 
sufficient to satisfy minimal scrutiny but not strict scrutiny. 
A more substantially related state interest is the control of 
venereal disease, a major health problem,135 especially among homo-
sexuals.136 This interest is probably sufficiently furthered by the 
prohibitions to satisfy minimal scrutiny. The Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Roe v. W ade137 suggests that this state interest may even be 
compelling. In that case the Court held that the State's interest in 
protecting the health of a pregnant woman during the last nvo 
trimesters of pregnancy was sufficient to justify placing restrictions 
on the constitutionally protected right to have an abortion. If the 
state's interest in protecting an individual's health is compelling, its 
interest in maintaining public health through the control of con-
tagious venereal diseases would seem even stronger. However, both 
Wade and Doe v. Bolton,138 its companion case, invoked the less 
drastic means limitation. Restrictions on the right to have an abortion 
133. Project, supra note 3, at 787. 
134. See studies cited in D. WF.Sr, supra note 87, at 117-18, which show a small 
correlation between homosexuality and child molestation. See also Schofield, Social 
Aspects of Homosexuality, 40 BRIT. J. VENEREAL DISEASES 129, 130 (1964). Other 
studies have revealed a higher percentage of pedophiles among homosexual men. For 
example, in c. BERG, FEAR, PUNISlllffiNT, ANXIEIY AND THE WOLFENDEN REPORT 33-34 
(1959), one study was reported in which, of 1,022 men in prison for homosexual of-
fenses, 58 per cent involved offenses against boys under the age of 15. Similarly, accord-
ing to a recent analysis of appellate cases involving the charge of sodomy, over 50 per 
cent involved one or more children between the ages of five and nineteen. R. MITCHELL, 
supra note 103, at 11. However, these higher percentages probably reflect the fact that 
those who molest children are more frequently apprehended than homosexual people 
who engage in sexual acts only with consenting adults. The fact that the distinction 
between homosexuality and pedophilia has not been recognized is deplored by the 
majority of homosexual people who " ••• do not share, do not approve, and fear to be 
associated with paedophiliac interests." D. WF.Sr, supra note 87, at 119. 
135. N.Y. Times, March 14, 1974, at 11, col. I (late city ed.). 
136. Fluker, Recent Trends in Homosexuality in West London, 42 BRIT. J. VENEREAL 
DISEASES 48 (1966), 
137. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
138. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
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are permissible only " ... to the extent that the regulation reasonably 
relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health."180 
The state could use less drastic means to control venereal disease. 
Sodomy prohibitions are overinclusive in that they affect both homo-
sexual males and lesbians, although the latter "practically never 
become infected except through contact with men."140 They are also 
overinclusive because they prohibit stable homosexual relationships 
as well as isolated homosexual contacts, although only the latter are 
responsible for the disproportionately high incidence of venereal 
disease within the homosexual population.141 Thus, under strict scru-
tiny the state could probably justify at most regulation of infected 
homosexuals. 
It can be argued that the prohibition of all homosexual conduct 
actually contributes to the spread of venereal disease. The high 
incidence of venereal disease among homosexual individuals results 
primarily from the promiscuous nature of many homosexual relation-
ships, 142 rather than from the distinctive characteristics of anal and 
oral intercourse.143 Homosexual persons attribute the prevalence of 
promiscuity primarily to the laws prohibiting homosexual conduct: 
Many homosexuals say that they are so placed that, for fear of 
the law, they dare not be known to have male friends. Having no 
other means of finding partners, they have to resort to picking up 
strangers "incognito" . . . . They say that the law as it now stands 
leaves no alternative sexual outlet for the homosexual other tl1an 
intercourse with strangers and male prostitutes and so encourages 
the spread of venereal disease.1« 
The prohibitions on homosexual conduct outlaw homosexual mar-
riages, 145 discourage stable relationships, and encourage furtive affairs. 
The prohibitions also contribute to the higher incidence of venereal 
disease among homosexual people by discouraging them from seeking 
treatment or diagnosis. Although at present "[t]he diagnosis of 
139. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163. 
140. G. HENRY, Au. THE SEXES 366 (1955). 
141. M. HoFFMAN, THE GAY WORLD 168 (1968); Jackson, Syphilis. The Role of the 
Homosexual, 19 MEO. SERVICES J. CANADA 631, 634 (1963); Schofield, supra note 184, at 
131-32. 
142. See text accompanying note 141 supra. 
143. Homosexual Practices and Venereal Diseases, 1964 LANCET (pt. 1) 481. But see 
Schofield, supra note 184, at 132: "It should also be remembered that the promiscuous 
homosexual does not use a sheath, and that this increases the chance of contracting 
and passing on an infection." 
144. Jefferiss, Venereal Disease and the Homosexual, 32 BRIT. J. VENEREAL DISEASES 
17, 20 (1956). See also Schofield, supra note 184, at 131. 
145. See Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 
409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
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venereal diseases is manifestly more difficult in homosexuals because 
of hidden lesions in the rectal and oral mucosa in the passive sexual 
partner,''146 this difficulty would be simplified if homosexual indi-
viduals felt free to disclose their sexual orientation to a physician.147 
If a physician is aware of the possibility of anal or oral infection, his 
examination ·will generally disclose the hidden lesions.148 Efforts to 
control venereal disease are also impeded because homosexual persons 
at present do not aid medical authorities in locating infected con-
tacts. Many homosexual persons are unable to name their partners 
because their contacts are made anonymously to avoid exposure.149 
Further, infected homosexuals are reluctant to incriminate them-
selves or their partners.150 
The state interest in maintaining a socially effective citizenry can 
justify the prohibitions only if it can be shown that homosexuality 
hinders an individual from fulfilling most useful roles in society. The 
authorities are divided over whether this relationship can be pre-
sumed. With regard to the homosexual's ability to function as an 
employee one federal district court has stated: 
Because of the potential for blackmail, [an employee's homosexuality] 
might jeopardize the security of classified communications. . . . [I]t 
may in some circumstances be evidence of an unstable personality 
unsuited for certain kinds of work. If an employee makes offensive 
overtures while on the job, or if his conduct is notorious, the reac-
tions of other employees and of the public with whom he comes in 
contact in the performance of his official functions may be taken into 
account.151 
Engaging in any homosexual activity still conclusively bars an indi-
vidual from admission to the military.152 The Court of Claims has 
stated: "Any schoolboy knows that a homosexual act is immoral, in-
decent, lewd and obscene. Adult persons are even more conscious 
that this is true. If activities of this kind are allowed to be practiced 
in a government department, it is inevitable that the efficiency of 
the service will in time be adversely affected."153 However, the un-
146. Nicol, Homosexuality and Venereal Disease, 184 THE PRAcrmONER 345, 349 
(1960); Trice &: Clark, Transmission of Venereal Diseases Through Homosexual Prac-
tices, 54 S. MED. J. 76, 79 (1961). 
147. Jackson, supra note 141, at 632. · 
148. Trice, Homosexual Transmission of Venereal Diseases, 88 MEDICAL TIMES 1286 
(1960). 
149. Schofield, supra note 134, at 133. 
150. Jefferiss, Homosexually Acquired Venereal Diseases, 42 BRIT. J. VENEREAL DIS-
EASES 46 (1966). 
151. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Richardson v. 
Hampton, 345 F. Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1972). 
152. R. MITCHELL, supra note 103, at 49-50. 
153. Schlegel v. United States, 316 F.2d 1372, 1378 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 
U.S. 1039 (1970). 
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particularized and unsubstantiated contention that possible embar-
rassment to an agency stem.ming from an employee's homosexuality 
may threaten the agency's performance has been rejected.1114 In the 
area of public education it has been held that a male teacher's homo• 
sexuality does not presumptively render him unfit to teach.11:ili Simi-
larly, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a Civil 
Service employee could not be discharged for engaging in private 
consensual adult homosexual conduct without a showing of an effect 
on the efficiency of the service.156 Thus, while there may be certain 
functions, such as military service or jobs involving classified infor-
mation, for which homosexuals are presumptively unfit, homosexu-
ality apparently does not unsuit an individual for all or even most 
societal functions. Therefore, a ban on all homosexual activity will 
not significantly further the state interest in maintaining an effective 
citizenry. 
It has been argued that the prohibition on homosexual conduct 
is necessary to encourage new marriages and to prevent the breakup 
of existing marriages.157 Although perhaps sufficient for minimal 
scrutiny, this interest probably fails to meet the compelling state 
interest/less drastic means test for several reasons. First, the relation-
ship between the prohibition on homosexual conduct and the state's 
interest in protecting marriages seems tenuous. Clearly the prohibi-
tion has no effect on homosexuals witli no interest in heterosexual 
conduct; such persons will probably not enter into heterosexual mar-
riages regardless of the prohibition. Moreover, the interest may 
simply not be sufficiently important. Without articulating its reasons, 
the Supreme Court summarily held in New Jersey Welfare Rights 
Organization v. Cahill158 that the state purpose to preserve and 
strengthen traditional family life is not a compelling state interest 
where individual rights to welfare benefits are concerned. Finally, 
the use of a prohibition on homosexual activity as a means to preserve 
the institution of heterosexual marriage is seriously underinclusive. 
Extramarital heterosexual conduct may have a more detrimental 
effect on marriage than extramarital homosexual conduct,1u0 but 
154. Norton v. Macy, 41'7 F.2d 1161, 116'7 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
155. Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), af/d. on other 
grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3209 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974): 
Morrison v. State 13d. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 361 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969). 
156. Norton v. Macy, 41'7 F.2d 1161 (1969). See also Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 
740 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Richardson v. Hampton, 345 F. Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1972), Cf, 
13outilier v. Immigration &: Naturalization Serv., 38'7 U.S. 118, 128 (1967) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting): "It is common knowledge that in this century homosexuals have risen high 
in our own public service-both in Congress and in the Executive 13ranch-and have 
served with distinction." 
15'7. P. Wn.soN, supra note 50, at 52. 
158. 411 U.S. 619 (1973). 
159. P. WILSON, supra note 50, at 52. 
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fornication and adultery are not prohibited in all states.160 In those 
states in which adultery and fornication are proscribed the penalties 
are often much less severe than for homosexual acts.161 The disparity 
in punishment constitutes a form of underinclusion and indicates that 
the states either do not regard the preservation of heterosexual mar-
riages as the real purpose of the prohibition on homosexual conduct 
or do not regard that purpose as sufficiently compelling to warrant 
full use of the state's power to penalize. 
The strongest argument a state can marshal to justify abridge-
ments of a homosexual's rights is based on the state's interest in pre-
serving " 'the tone of the society, the mode, ... the style and quality 
of life.' "162 In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton163 the Supreme Court 
held that a state prohibition on the showing of obscene movies in 
places of public accommodation was justified in order to prevent the 
spread of antisocial behavior. The Court's opinion does not define 
"antisocial behavior," but the term appears to include all sexual con-
duct that a state might consider immoral. In dictum included in his 
dissent in Poe v. Ullman,164 Justice Harlan explicitly tied a state's 
interest in guarding public morality to the prohibition of private 
adult consensual homosexual conduct: 
... [S]ociety is not limited in its objects only to the physical well-
being of the community, but has traditionally concerned itself with 
the moral soundness of its people as well. Indeed to attempt a line 
between public behavior and that which is purely consensual or 
solitary would be to withdraw from community concern a range of 
subjects with which every society in civilized times has found it nec-
essary to deal. The laws regarding marriage which provide both 
when the sexual powers may be used and the legal and societal con-
text in which children are born and brought up, as well as laws for-
bidding adultery, fornication and homosexual practices which express 
the negative of the proposition confining sexuality to lawful mar-
riage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our 
social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build 
upon that basis.165 
In one sense Paris Adult Theatre I is a harder case than one 
160. See statutes cited notes 65, 66 supra. 
161. See statutes cited note 67 supra. 
162, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 59 (1973), quoting Bickel, On Por-
nography II, Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, 22 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 25 (1971). 
163. 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
164. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
165. 367 U.S. at 545-46. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965), Justice 
Goldberg quoted approvingly from Harlan's dissent in Poe. Justice Goldberg's quota-
tion of Harlan indicates that neither he nor Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, 
who joined Goldberg's opinion, question a state's right to forbid homosexual conduct 
on moral grounds. 
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involving prohibition of homosexual conduct. Because Paris Adult 
Theatre I involved no fundamental rights the Court did not apply 
the compelling state interest test and did not require proof of the 
connection between the showing of obscene movies and antisocial 
behavior. In defending a prohibition on homosexual conduct, there 
could not be a proof problem; the prohibition on the conduct the 
state views as immoral clearly -furthers the state interest in con-
demning that conduct. A less drastic means might be the use of 
persuasion rather than the power of the criminal law, but it is ques-
tionable how effective that alternative would be. 
The extent to which a state legislature is free to legislate morality, 
however, is in dispute.166 Whether or not it can, the state interest in 
branding as immoral individual private homosexual conduct cannot 
be compelling if the right to engage in such conduct is indeed a 
fundamental right, because the state's interest would then be dia-
metrically opposed to the value embodied in the constitutional right. 
In other words, the question whether the state can legislate morality 
in this area is precisely the same as the question whether the exercise 
of homosexuality is a fundamental right for due process purposes. 
The foregoing due process analysis167 thus is also an argument that 
the state's interest in legislating moral judgments with regard to 
homosexual conduct is not legitimate, much less compelling. 
The due process argument therefore stands or falls on whether 
private consensual adult homosexual conduct is a fundamental right. 
If it is not, the state's interests in controlling venereal disease and in 
legislating morality should be sufficient to withstand minimal scru-
tiny. Similarly, the success of the equal protection argument under 
the traditional two-tier standard depends on whether a fundamental 
right or a suspect class is involved. 
Justice Marshall's approach to equal protection, however, may 
offer an avenue to constitutional protection even if strict scrutiny 
cannot be invoked.168 It has already been argued that an individual's 
interest in engaging in homosexual conduct has a sufficiently close 
connection w_ith the constitutional right of privacy and that homo-
sexuals have sufficient indicia of a suspect class to raise the scrutiny 
the sodomy laws must withstand above the level of minimal ration-
ality.169 Objections to state regulation based on underinclusion, 
overinclusion, or the availability of less drastic means, however, are 
probably less telling where fundamental rights or suspect classes are 
166. See, e.g., P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MoRALS (1959); H. HART, LAw, LID• 
ERTY AND MORALITY (1963); Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 
YALE LJ. 986 (1966). 
167. See text accompanying notes 14-62 supra. 
168. See text accompanying notes 109-12 supra. 
169. See text following note 112 supra. 
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not involved. The state interests in controlling venereal disease and
promoting traditional heterosexual marriages might thus provide
stronger arguments for the state under Marshall's test than under
strict scrutiny, although the state's interest in governing sexual mo-
rality is subject to the same criticism as under the two-tier standard:
To the extent that a court finds a nexus between an individual's in-
terest in engaging in private consensual adult homosexual conduct
and the right of privacy, it cannot also embrace the opposite value
judgment that a state has a strong interest in intruding upon indi-
vidual sexual morality. It is difficult to foresee how a court will weigh
the competing interests when they are evaluated on these sliding
scales because, as its critics have pointed out,' 70 Justice Marshall's
test leaves much room for judicial value judgments. Nevertheless, it
seems that the state's burden of proof might well be too demanding
under this test to justify prohibiting homosexual conduct on the
basis of any of the state interests discussed above.
Aside from the unclear result under Justice Marshall's test, there
is a tactical reason for advocates of homosexual rights to eschew novel
constitutional theory and hew to well-established doctrine: Homo-
sexuality is simply too controversial a topic to expect a court to
create new constitutional law in order to protect it. Even the recog-
nition of a new suspect class for equal protection purposes, a step the
Court has recently been unwilling to take, may be too much of a
doctrinal development to expect. But the developing right of privacy
offers a traditional constitutional argument that requires no major
doctrinal change in order to protect homosexuality. In extending the
right of privacy to all forms of heterosexual conduct, the courts have
gone so far that exclusion of homosexuality cannot be justified. The
privacy argument is dearly the best argument and one that should
succeed in securing constitutional protection for the private exercise
of consensual adult homosexual activity.
170. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
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